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1. 
PREFACE 
The story of the fluid milk industry (a term which 
I shall not attempt to define) during the past half 
century is indeed a rewardi~g source of study, for in 
it we may observe the working of almost every economic 
phenomenon a.nd every form of economic organisation. 
We see an industry beginning in a state of absolute 
la.issez-fa.ire, and developing successively into a volun-
tary combination f?r collective bargaining purposes, a 
compulsory combination with statutory powers and a state-
controlled industry Wlder a centralised authority, finish-
ing as a combination of the two latter; and being affected 
by and reacting to booms and depression, "dumping", under 
and. o·ver production, free trade and protection, rational-
isation and discriminating market policy. A more event-
ful history can hardly be envisaged. 
It is ine·vitable that a work of this nature should 
be primarily factual and historical: the very structure 
of the work is chronoligical. Nevertheless it is intended 
that critical comment and contemporary opinion will be 
included wherever possible. 
The immediate subject of this work, we have said, 
will be fluid milk. It would be unrealistic, however, 
to attempt to divorce this from the other products of the 
dairying industry, both because of the degree of substi-
tution existing between the products and of the complex 
nat·ure of the marketing organisations which ha.ve been 
evolved. 
The decision to deal with England and Wales only 
rather than Great Britain as a whole was dictated by 
the desire for simplicity of treatment and the avail-
ability of statistics. Except in two or three instances 
(which are clearly indicated) the figures quoted refer 
only to England and Wales. 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
. . . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE POSITION BEFORE 1921 
THE: STRUCTURE OF THE MILK MARKET in the last 
years of the nineteenth century was very different 
from that which is now familiar to us. It was 
essentially an unorganised market, or was organised 
on .a largely local basis. Liquid milk in particular 
was consumed only about its place of production, and 
if no local market was to be found was sent further 
afield in manufactured form. Most centres of pop-
ulation obtained their fluid milk supplies from city 
' . 
cowsheds in the immediate hinterland, and only London 
imported ~pplies to any extent. During the first 
decade. of the present century the position was little 
.altered. Only very slowly did the widening of liquid 
milk markets progress: it was not until 191.2 ·- 14, for 
example, that country collecting points for milk dest-
ined for urban areas began to appear.· It was natural 
:that this sho·uld be so, for "bile relative prices of 
fluid milk and the milk-equivalent of dairy products 
had not, at this time, started the divergence which 
was to become ~ch a marked feature of the milk market 
in later years. Indeed, the prices af manufactured 
milk-products tended to be slightly higher than that 
of fluid milk, especially during the summer months. 
In consequence the output of butter and cheese was 
concentrated du!ing the ~mmer months, and became 
negligible during the mont~s of October, November and 
Dece.cnber, when the fluid milk price was at its highest 
level. 
As ~ill be seen from the figures quoted, the 
winter prices during the years 1905 - ·14 tended to be 
25% - 33% higher than the summer ones - a difference 
which was to persist until the early 194o's (except 
duxing the period of price control during 1917- 21.) 
The prices quoted in the accompanying tables are prob-
ably not representative of countzy prices, being based 
largely upon city contract and "accoimnodation" rates. 
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Liquid Milk at London Cheddar Cheese British 
Year Winter Summer Summer Full Butter 
Price Price .Year Summer 
1905 - 6 9d. 6!d. 
19"06, - 7 9id. '7-ld. 7d. 7d. 6d. 
1907 
- 8 9id. 7-td. 6id. 6-id. 5-!d. 
1908 - 9 9id. 7id. 6id .• 6id. 6d. 
1909 - 10 9id. 7i-d. 6-jd. 6-l-d. 5!d. 
1910 - 11 9-td. 7i·d. 6i-d. Grid. 6d. 
.1911 - 12 10 - 11!d. 7 - 7!d. 7-i-d. 7!-d. 6d. 
1912 - 13 10!d. 7!d. 7d. 1d·. 6d. 
1913 - 14 10i-d. Sd. 7d. 7i-d. 6·id. 
(COHEN, "History of Milk ·Prices"· p. 24.) 
It will be seen, then, that during this period it 
would be profitable for any farmer situated some distance 
from liquid markets and faced with considerable "transport 
charges on liquid milk, to produce cheese or butter during 
the summer months. Cohen suggests that the returns to 
liquid producers more than 100 miles from London be red.uced 
by twopence a gallon for the purpose of this comparison. 
Farmers selling to the liquid market did so by one 
of three methods. They might retail the milk themselves, 
a practice accounting for a far greater proportion of the 
fluid market at that time than it does today. Or they 
might supply milk to a dealer under contract, usually 
agreed upon for a term ~ six months. Finally, they might 
put their milk, contained in the then universal 15 ~allon 
conical cans, onto a train to be taken to the nearest 
population cen.tre and there to be sold as "'platform" mi~k. 
that is, auctioned in open market. Whichever method of 
disposal the farmer selected the pricing involved was 
inevitably of an arbitrary nature. The producer-retailer 
might base his price upon his concept of "what the market 
would bear" or '~a fair price"·, or upon what neighbouring 
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retailers. were charging. If farmer and dealer contracted 
together the terms w~re produced solely by agreement between 
the two, and must have varied widely in their terms ~~d 
stipulations. Variations in platform prices would be 
even more severe. The farmer can hardly be said to have 
enjoyed a secure market in this period. 
Nevertheless,. the years 1900-1914 were good ones 
for the dairy farmer, and dairying occupied a steadily 
increasing proportion of British agricultural activity. 
·The total of heifers in milk or calf increased from 
2,558,236 in the period 1893 - 1902 to 2,740,695 in 
1903 - 12, whilst the number of beef cattle fell proportion-
ately. That this increased production led to no fall in 
price may be attributed to two factors. Firstly, population 
was not only increasing during this period, but was increasing 
at a higher rate than during the preceding period, and during 
the period 1891 - 1911 the total population rose by more than 
seven million. Secondly, this was a period of rising real 
wages and living standards, at least until 1906, though 
consumption per head of many commodities fell after that 
date. Consequently the prices of all the milk-products 
rose, and continued_to rise throughout the period (see 
figures above.) 
One further factor must be mentioned. Imported dairy 
products were already &_considerable factor in the economy, 
and continued to rise until 1906. During 1907 - 8 the 
proportion of imported to home-produced dairy products was: 
Home :12roduced Im:12orted 
Fluid Milk 100 0 
Cream 95 5 
Butter ·13 87 
Cheese . 24 76 
Other products 93 7 
Total 42 58 
(DERIVED FROM COHEN, "History of Milk Prices" p.25) 
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Nevertheless the drastic undercutting of British m~nu­
factured milk-product prices by imported products had 
;Yet to begin, and during this period imported prices 
were never more than 12 - 15'% below tho1:;1e of. home produced 
commodities and the cheaper English cheeses were frequently 
priced below the level of imported cheese. Consumption per 
head of imported ~~d of home-produced manufactured milk 
products rose and fell simultaneously with each other and 
not at each other's expense, and were·presumably functions 
of the price-lead and real wages alone. There is no indi-
cation that. the producers of British manufactured milk-
products were forced to price their goods in relation to 
the prices·of imported alternRtives at this time, though this 
was to happen soon after the first world war. 
WHOLESALE BUTTER PRICES P:ER CWT. , 1905 - 14. 
YEAR BRITISH DANISH SPREAD 
1905 12}j/- 115/- Si/-
1906 133/- 119/- 14/-
1907 128i/- 114i/- 14/-
1908 131/- 122/- 9/-
1909 13Q-~/- 118!/- 12/-
1910 131/- 120/- 11/-
1911 134-~/- 123/- 9t/-
1912 135/- 130/- 5-a/-
1913 134!/- 127/- s-a-/-
1914 136/- 130i/- 5i/-
Averages 131-l/- 122/- 10/-
(COHEN, "History of Milk Prices", p.40) 
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' WHOLESALE CHEESE PRICES PER CWT., 1905/14. 
Year LANCS CHEDDAR) LANes/' CHEDDAR CANADIAN CANADIAN CANADIAN 
SPREAD SPREAD 
1905 59-t/- 71i/~ 55-i/- 16/-· 4/~ 
1906 66/- 75i/- 62i/- 13/- :»!-
1907 66/- 78i/- 63/- 15-i/- 3/-
1908 62/- 74-l-/- 62/- 12-l/- 0 
1909 66/- 75i/- 61/- 14i/- 5/-
1910 62/- 74i/- 59/- 15i/- 3/-
1911 64/- 79/- 64·1/- 14i/-
- i/-
1912 67i/- 62/- 70/- 12/- - 2-l/-
1913 66-l/- 76i/- 75/- 11-i/-- 1i/-
1914 60i/- 82/- "(2/- 10/- - 5i/-
Average 64-l/- 77/- 63-f/- + 13i/- + 1-i/-
(CONEH, "History of Milk Prices", p.44.) 
Cheddar is selected for this comparison as being the 
most expensive quantity-produced English cheese, Lancashire 
as being the cheapest. 
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During the first world war the government's one con-
cern ve. s to increase and regula.rise the production of milk· 
lest it should fall below demand. Three measures were in-
troduced with this end in view. Dairy farmers concerned in 
the production of liquid milk were given priority demands upon 
feeding stuffs. "The production of butter was discouraged by 
setting a low controlled price upon it, and the milk used in 
its manufacture diverted to the liquid market and to cheese 
production. Thirdly, and most important, the price of liquid 
milk was controlled for the first time and was set at a remark-
~bly high level. The average contract price of milk increased 
from 13.27d. per gallon during 1915 - 16 to 24.ld. per gallon 
in 1918 - 19, and rose still further during the following year. 
Moreover the difference between summer and winter contract 
prices was much increased in an attempt to encourage level 
production. Whereas in 1914 - 15 the winter price had been 
1.2 times the summer, by 1919 - 20 it had been fixed at 1.7 
times as high, though it was quickly to return to a normal 
level when controls were relaxed. 
Another important development was that the retail margin 
was much increased, being approximately 26% above control 
price in 1914 and 48% above by 1921. 
Finally, the threatened shortage of milk and the scarcity 
of labour and transport led to a considerable degree of con-
solidation and_ co-operation amongst milk dealers and retailers, 
including the formation of United Dairies. There was no corres-
ponding development in the production side of·the industry. 
SUMMER AND WINTER CONTRACT PRICES AND 
AVERAGE RETAIL M .. l\...llG INS , 1914"- 1922. 
Winter Summer Av.Retail Margin 
1914 - 15 10.25d. 9. 5d. 7.0d. 
1915 - 16 13.25d. 13.3d. 7.5d. 
1916 
- 17 16.25d. 14.0d. 8.8d. 
1917 - 18 21.9d. 15.9d. ll.ld. 
1918 - 19 28.25d. 19.9d. 11.9d. 
1919 - 20 33.7d. 19.8d. 13.6d. 
1920 - 21 30.9d. 19.7d. 13 •. 4d. 
1921 
-
22 23. 3d .• 11.5d. 12.6d. 
(COHEN, "History of Milk Prices", p.5/8) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HARD TII'I.IES I AND THE FIRST 
ATTID.~TS AT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. 
The first world war left the dairy farmer in a con-
siderably worse position than it had found him. There 
was no vast increase in the demand for liquid· milk to 
parallel that which was to develop during the 1939 - 43 
war; due, no doubt, to the high level at which prices were 
fixed, and to the fact that no flat-rate subsidy was provided 
to bring milk within reach of the public, the subsidy which 
was provided being more of a dole paid to the needy if they 
made application for it and. drawn from the local rates. 
Moreover, the war had considerably strengthened the hands 
of the dealers by encouraging them to co-operate, so that 
in bargaining powers they now possessed ·a marked advantage. 
Finally, consumer incomes began to.fall, and this was 
reflected in the next batch of contract prices , the terms 
of which the dealers must have virtually dictated. The 
winter contract of 1921 - 22 was 25% lower than the previous 
year, the following summer contract price showed a fall of 
42%.· Faced with dwindling profits the milk producers 
might consider three lines of action: they might attempt 
to reduce their costs, increase sales, or .strengthen their 
bargaining position. All three were attempted, but it is 
the last which is of prior interest to us, The only b.ody 
which was able, at this time, to speak for a majority of 
farmers, the National Farmers' Union, opened negotiations 
with the :National l!,ederation of Dairymen's Associations 
during the autumn of 1920. No agreement was reached, how-
ever. The negotiations were repeated during 1921, but 
again the conflicting interest-groups were unable to come 
to terms. Finally, in 1922, a settlement was agreed upon. 
By this time the autumn milk price level was only 28% above 
the pre-war level, compared with a general index of agri-
cultural products 64~ above the base~ There can be little 
doubt, then, that .some collective action was necessary at 
this stage. 
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THE N. F. u. MIIIK SCHEME I 1922 - 1929 
This scheme, the first example of successful collective 
bargaining in the English milk industry, though called into 
existence by a deteriore.tion in the farmers.' bargaining 
position, was by no means concerned solely with strengthening 
that position. In the words of R. B. Forrester, commenting 
upon the N.F.U. schemes in 1927, 
"The actual scheme was much more than an attempt by 
the farmers' organisation to strengthen weak bar-
gainers; it was a considered effort to deal with 
certain general difficulties in milk production, 
of which variations in output between summer and 
winter periods and the presence of milk supplies 
in excess of actual fluid milk requirements, w·ere 
the chief. The unfortunate effect of these 
factors upon prices had ·been recognised, but no 
systematic effert to control their effects had 
previously been made in this country". 
Forrester rather ignores the go-verrunent policy of 
encouraging winter production during 1916 - 1920 mentioned 
previously, but there seems little doubt that a surplus supply 
had developed for the first time. Statistics are not avail-
able, but dairy herds had been increasing steadily and the 
state encouragement of milk production during the war was now 
having its fu,ll effect. This, combined with falling consumer 
incomes and the fact that the rate of increase of the po_pulation 
had fallen from 10.41G in 1911 to 4.7% by 1921, must surely have 
given rise to surplus production. Not until 1924, however, 
did the manufacturing price of milk fall consistently below 
the average liquid price, and then not to any consideraple 
extent. ·rt was against this background that the N.F.-U. 
scheme was formulated. 
The 1922 milk scheme authorised the formation of a 
Permanent ~oint Milk Committee through which all pricing 
agreements were to be reached. The original participants 
in this were simply the National Farmers' Union and National 
Fede~ation of Dairymen's Associations. Between 1922 and 
1929, however, the Farmers• Co-operative Dairy Societies, the 
National Association of Creamery Proprietors and the National 
·Association of Co-operative Milk Sellers gained representation 
upon the committee. 
It must be emphasised that the scheme was entirely 
voluntary so far as the individual producer was concerned. 
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He was under no obligation to accept the terms negotiated 
o.r pay the ·terms introduced for the maintenance of the 
scheme, nor could he be penalised in any way. Nevertheless 
the terms negotiated ~uickly became the ruling ones in the 
London area, and seem to have provided a basis for prices 
in other regions at this time. 
The essential features of the scheme were: 
i) Farmers were called upon to mske their contracts 
for twelve months and not, as had been the custom, 
for six. It was thought that this would lead 
to a more secure market in that it covered a 
complete cycle and involved both summer and winter 
conditions in the same agreement. 
ii) Differentiation was made between milk to be 
sold in liquid form and milk destined for man-
ufacturing purposes, and.the prices paid to 
producers for each were to be decided separately. 
For each farmer a "basic quantity" of milk was 
determined by reference to his production durir~ 
certain-winter months (the "accounting pe;riod".) 
For this quantity he was to be paid at liquid 
prices, for any further production at manufacturing 
prices, the manufacturing price to be based upon 
the price of imported cheeses, and the ••·basic 
quantity~ ?n quota to be re-assessed a~~ually. 
This arra~~ement was of little practical im-
portance, however, as until 1929 the manufacturing· 
price fell below liquid prices only d.uring the 
winter months, and when in 1929 it began to be 
lower than average liquid prices the scheme 
became unworkable. 
T~e importance of the 1922 agreement, then,_ lay not so 
much i-n the measures introduced to reconcile the liquid and 
manufacturing markets, a problem which at that time had not 
grown acute, ~ut simply ·in the degree to which it strengthened 
the p.roducer.~ I!? ·bargaining power and enabled him to negotiate a 
batter price. The headlong fall in milk prices seems to have 
been arrested at a level which would just enable the surplus 
to be sold, for the price of winter milk fell by only ljd. 
from 1922 to 1924, compared with lOd. during the pr~vious 
three years. 
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There seems to have been. a certain degree of com-
placency in the milk producing industry at this time, 
especially with regard to the marketing and bargaining 
arrangements. R. B. Forrester, whose ••Report on the 
Fluid Milk Market"· was prepared in 1927, does indeed 
realise that an excess of milk was beginning to be offered 
to the !quid market, but does not believe that any modi-
fication to the Milk Scheme 1s called for. Rather, he 
seems certain that an expansion of demand for mille to be 
engineered through.publicity and the clean and graded milk 
policies will be sufficient to selve the problem. It is 
interesting to note here that producers using the Milk 
Scheme were called upon ·to make a small contribution to a 
National Milk Publicity Council between 1922 and 1926, and 
that the ·concept of special quality milk selling at premium 
prices had been g!ven :recognition by the Milk (Special 
Designations) Order of 1922, milk being designated "certified", 
"Grade A (T.T.)", "Grade A:" or "Pasturised", according to its 
preparation and treatment. Producers were slow to adopt the 
scheme, however, and by 1927 only 500 producers had applied. 
for graded milk licences from a total of more than 100,000, 
a figure too small to be economically significant. 
Forrester does indeed foreshadow future· developments 
in his summary when he says "The most obvious road to 
farmers' control of surplus is by means of centre.l, or 
rather regional, selling agencies", but this idea is not 
expanded. Of the Permanent Joint Milk Committee arrange-
ments he says "In conclusion, reference must be made to the 
system of fixing wholesale prices for fluid milk in different 
areas of E~gland and Wales by the method of collective 
bargaining between organised producers and distributors. 
At a time of increasing supplies and of a general fall in 
prices, large numbers of small producers, making contracts 
often with big buyers, might have become disorganised through 
exceptional pressure unless some form of collective negotiation 
had been introduced ••••.• certainly, it is difficult to see 
how individual producers could, on the average, have obtained 
terms of so favourable a character as those secured through 
the negotiations of the permanent joint committee." , and 
finally:-
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"A last general point is that the permanent joint 
committee for price negotiations, which is representative 
of the chief interests in the fluid milk markets, is 
obviously well suited by its constitution for the consider-. 
ation of common interests of which the most important is, 
without doubt, the stimulation of demand." 
Only two years after this was wri-tten, however, tend-
encies were to begin to appear which would lead to the dis-
integration of the N.F.U. milk schemes. 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MODIFIED SCHEME. 1929f32. 
A.s we have said, the N.F.U. milk scheme of 1922 "based 
the farmer's basic quant:Lty quota on his production during 
certain winter months. This acted as a considerable stim-
ulus to the winter production, so much so that by 1927 - 28 
dealers were finding themselves forced to use milk, for which 
they had paid winter liquid prices, for manuf~cturing purposes. 
Until 1929 this was of no great significance, as the differ-
' ence between the two prices was negligible. In 1929, how-
ever, the price paid to the producer for manufacturing milk 
began to fall r~pidly. 
Manu-
Liquid facturing Excess 9f 
Summer of Price Price Liquid Price 
1922 9.0d. 9.5d. 0.5d. 
1923 9.0d. 7.5d. + 1.5d. 
1924 9.0d. 8.8d. + 0.2d. 
1925 lO.Od. 8.6d. + 1.4d. 
1926 9.0d. 7.5d. + 1.5d. 
1927 9.0d. 9.1d. 0.1d. 
1928 9.0d. 8.2d. + o.ad. 
1929 9.4d. 
1930 9.5d. 4.6d. + 4.9d. 
1931 9.8d. 4.6d. + 5.2d. 
1932 9.7d. 5d. + 4!' 7d. 
(COHEN, "History of Milk Prices", p.75) 
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The reason for this was a steady fall in the prices of 
imported-cheese and bu~ter which were now being sold at 
prices which were uneconomic for the British dairying 
industry. It now became essential to reduce the manu-
facturing price of milk to a level which would enable 
British cheese and butter to sell at competitive prices, 
arid for the first time it became a matter of grave concern 
for farmer and dealer alike to sell as much as possible of 
the milk passing through their hands,at liquid prices. 
It was obviously essential to replace the basic quota 
. . 
system, productive as it was with a winter glut of milk, 
with something more realistic. 
The ~odi~ied system was introduced for the contract 
period 1929/1930. Each farmer now had to state a declared 
quantity of milk which he would endeavour to deliver through-
out the year. · Three different classes of producer were 
defined; a Class I which was permitted a 10% monthly 
variation from the declared quantity only, a Class·rr 
permitted a 20% variation, and a Class III with 50% variation, 
slightly higher pri~es being paid for milk from Class I 
and II. For any excess or deficiency outside these permitted 
limits a producer was fined the sum of 2d. a gallon. The 
majority of dealers soon began to insist upon a modified 
contract, however, whereby excess deliveries were paid for 
at manufacturing prices rather than 2d. below ·liquid price, 
for by 1930 the spread between the two was as great as 4.9d., 
consequently a new class, IIb, was introduced, and soon 
became almost universal in London. at least. Producers 
delivered their total product to the dealer and received 
liquid price·.i,~ for a certain proportion and manufacturing 
price for the remainder, the proporti?n being adjusted in 
relation to the pe~centage actually b:eing sold in the liquid 
market by the dealers. This percentage averaged:-
S~fo during 1930 - 1 
and 75% during 1931 - 2 
~nd 1932 - 3. 
The position, however, continued to aeteriorate. The price 
of imported cheese continued to fall, and as it fell, so did 
the manufacturing price of milk, as the following figures show:-
15 
Year Canadian Cheese Manufacturing 
1- per cwt. Milk 
d. per gallon 
1928 214 9.1 
1929 210 8.2 
1930 180.5 
1931 158.5 4.6 
1932 149.5 4.6 
(DERIVF.J) FROM COHEN, "History of Milk Prices"') 
Nevertheless,the price of imported cheese continued to fall 
more rapidly than that of home-produced cheeses, and the 
divergence between their prices increased. In 1929 the 
difference had been only 19/- per cwt., by 1932 it was 33/6d. 
Mo~eover, the quantity of cheese and butter imported was in-
creasing. It seemed fairly certain that further reductions 
in the manufacturing price would be necessary • 
. The liquid :price of milk had, up to this point, remained 
:· .. : /"; -fairly constant. The winter price for 1931 - 32 was almost 
4d. per gallon lower than during the previous winter, but a 
recovery of 2d. a gallon soon followed. The liquid price 
was being held at an unrealistically high level simply by 
means o:f organised bargaining. Two factors which might mean 
the complete breakdown of the system began to appear, however. 
Firstly, "'accommoda:tion" or platform prices, which throughout 
the century had di·verged very little from contract prices, now 
began to fall well below the current contract prices - a 
phenomenon which was almost certain to weaken the producer's 
position at the next price-fixing. Secondly, the real cause 
of the previous phenomenon perhaps, the low-cost producers of 
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the West and South-West, who had traditionally occupied 
themselves almost exclusively in the manufacturing market, 
now found that the price of manufacturing milk was too 
low to cover even their comparatively small outlay, and 
began to send their milk to London and the Midland cities 
in the hope of breaking into the liquid market. Moreover, 
falling transport costs coincident with the development of 
road ·transport seemed to encourage this tendency. The 
result of all this was inevitable. With so much milk on 
the market available·at any price above the manufacturing 
one, dealers were no longer willing to pay the unrealistically 
high prices which the Permanent Joint Milk Committee contracts 
had established. More and more farmers found themselves 
forced to abandon the contract price and a.ccept whatever 
was being offered for their milk, ann. by early 1932 the 
N.F.U. Milk Scheme was dead. 
Evaluation of the Milk Schemes 
There can be little doubt that the N.F.U. Milk schemes 
were initially of considerable benefit to the British Milk 
producer. Indeed, as long as an increased degree of 
collectivism on. the part of the dealers was the outstanding 
threat to stability in the milk market, the N.F.U. scheme 
seems to have been an adequate policy. But it was certainly 
not adequate to deal with the problems of over-production, 
price-cutting and foreign competition. This may be attrib-
uted t.o basic weaknesses in. a scheme of this nature. 
]'ir stly, participation in the scheme was entireiy volunia ry. 
The N.F.U. prepared specimen contracts which its members 
were advised to employ when making their own contracts, 
but whether or not the farmer did so was entirely his own 
business. Again, the N.F.TJ. sought by participation in 
the Permanent Join.t.l\IIilk Council, to obtain for its members 
the best possible prices for their milk, but if a producer 
chose to sell below these prices there ws no way of penal-
ising him. It was quite simple for a farmer to '"blackleg~' -
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to sell his milk at the best prices obtained at the 
Permanent Joint Council without participating in the 
schemes or paying the levies obligatory upon those who 
did. In fact, only a minority of milk producers did 
participate in this scheme. 
The N.F.U. was not a buyer of milk and no supplies 
passed through its hands, so that its function was little 
more than advisory. Nevertheless, the terms negotiate~ 
through the Permanent Joint Committee do seem to have been 
the. criterion upon which milk prices were largely based 
prior to the collapse of the scheme • 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGISLATION - THE AGRICULTURAL I~PJrnTING ACTS. 
The milk-producing industry was, then, faced with a 
·grave dilemma in 1932, a market which was rapidly disinte-
grating and a problem which might be resolved in one of 
two ways. Either the economic forces at work might be 
left to work themselves out a sane new marketing scheme, 
or a nation-wid.e and compulsory basis might be evolved. 
The first alternativ-e would have entailed the gradual 
forcing out of the industry of all the higher-cost producers 
until the supply of fluid milk no longer exceeded the demand. 
This would have probably meant that. the price. of liquid milk 
would have fallen to the level of manufacturing prices, and 
that milk production in the high-cost Eastern and South-East-
ern regions would have virtually ceased. That this situation 
was avoided and the latter alternative adopted was due in 
large part to the existence of statutory instruments legal-
ising combinations of this nature, the Agricultural Marketing 
Acts of 1931 and 1933. 
The Act of 1931 
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931 was passed by 
Parliament at a time when it had become obvious that lack 
of organisation and the inability to counter foreign com-
petition was making the position of British agriculture 
untenable. We m~ best illustrate the scope and nature . 
of the act by quoting from a number of its principle clauses 
as stated in the Lucas Report, 1947, for example:-
Submission and Approval 
"The proq.ucers of any agricultural product or any part 
thereof are enabled to prepare and submit for minist~,:rial 
and parliamentary approval a scheme to regulate the market-
ing of that product. " 
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Submission.and Approval (cont:) 
"If, at the poll, the scheme receives the support 
of not less than two-thirds (both by number and productive 
capacity) of the registered producers voting, it comes into 
force at the exp~ry of.the suspensory period (one to two 
months), and. is binding on all producers of the commodity 
within the area of the scheme". 
Election of Boards 
"Until the first election is held a board consists 
of the persons named in the scheme plus two nominees of 
. . 
the minister. Thereafter, boards are composed of repre-
sentatives_ of the registered producers •.•••.• together 
with two person.s of commercial or financial ability co-
opted by the elec~ed members". 
Powers of Boards 
"Under a trading scheme the board may take power to 
buy and sell the regulated product and a.ny secondary 
product, ..•••••• and to require that registered producers 
may only sell the product to or through the agency of the 
board." 
"Under a. regu.latory scheme the board is enabled to 
control the operations of the registered producers by 
determining the descriptions of the regulated product 
which producers may sell and the price at, below or above 
which, the terms on which, and the persons to, or through 
the agency of whom, the registered product or any quantity 
or product thereof m~ be sold. 
Enforcement Powers 
"f~~ producer in the arc of a scheme who sells the 
registered product without being registered or exempt is 
liable to prosecution and to the infliction of a fine." 
Every scheme under the acts shall provide for the·· 
establishment of a. fund into which all sums·received by the 
board shaJ..l be paid and out of ·which the board is required 
to pay all costs incurred by the scheme. Boards have powers 
to levy contributions on registered producers to form such 
a fund. 
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Quantitative Regulation of Su~lies 
The Acts give power to boards to .limit production 
indirectly through the control of sales of the regulated 
product. 
Safeguards 
The Act provides for the setting up of consumers' 
commi. ttees, which may ca.ll upon the board to furnish · 
accounts and any reasonable information, to report to 
the minister any effects upon consumers and complaints 
therefrom. A complaint may be referred to a committee 
of investigation appointed ·by the minister. The minister 
may, at his discretion, amend or resolve the scheme, or 
cause the matter in question to be rect:Lfied. 
Dissatisfied producers may· demand a poll and, given 
a simple majority, secure the revocation of the scheme. 
The Marketing Act of 1931, then, gave the producers 
full powers to formulate a marketing scheme and, if. 
"" approved, to enforce its acceptance and observatio by 
any dissident minority. Moreover, a Reorganisation 
Commission under Sir Edmund Grigg, was appointed to 
consider what form it would be most desirable for such a 
board to take. But neither in 1931 nor in 1932 did the 
producers take any steps to set up such a board. The 
reas·on for this delay was later stated by the IIJiilk 
l1.[arketing Board themselves in their official history 
''Producers felt that unless .they could have 
.some assurance of protection against cheap im-
ports which were damaging the home market, they 
could . .not agree to proceed with the establishment 
of a marketing scheme. It was not until Parliament 
passed the Agricultural marketing Act of 1933 that 
t;he representative body of producers gave its 
support to statutory organisation." 
The Lucas report which surveyed the whole problem of 
Agricultural Marketing in 1947 says much the same of the 
1931 Act. It states that: 
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"The f'irst Ag,ricultural Marketing Act simply did 
not fill the bill. It gave to producers a basis for 
long-term planning when what they wanted was immediate 
tangible aid. Moreover, even as a long t.erm policy 
it was asserted that the Act had a fata.l weakness. 
It called upon the home producer to undertake the new 
and difficult task of marketing reconst:ruction, in-
volving an abatement of his cherished liberty as an 
individual trader, but gave no assurance that steps 
would be taken to prevent the market as a whole from 
being swamped by the unrestricted inflow of cheap 
imports." 
The essential factor behind the delay in putting 
the 1931 act into operation, then, was the fear of 
"dumpir~" by foreign competitors. This had already 
happened in ·the Jlrh.eat market, and although there was 
little danger of liquid milk being treated in this 
manner it might well happen to butter and cheese, and 
it was by now realised that the liquid and manufactur:.ing 
prices of milk could not be permanently divorced. 
It was this fear that the act of '33 resolved. 
The Agricultural Marketir~ Act, 1933 
This act was concerned almost entirely with the 
regulation of supply, both home and imported. It 
d.ecreed that the Board might place a direct quantitative 
limit on sales by any pro.ducer and provided that any . 
such limit might be based on the producer's past sales. 
The most important section, however, was that in Part I 
which stated that 
"The Board of T.rade, after consul tat ion with the 
appropr~ate ministers, is empowered to regulate by order 
the importation into the United Kingdom o."t any Agricul-
tural product. Before making such an order • b.owever, 
the Bpard must be satisfied that: 
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(a) All practical and necessary steps have 
been t$ken for the efficient ·reorgan-
isation through marketing or development 
schemes of those branches of the agricul-
tural industry in whose interest the order 
is made; and 
(b) Unless such an order is made the effective 
organisation and development of the branches 
concerned under the scheme cannot be brought 
about or maintained." 
This removed the prime objection to statutory 
organisation, and a Milk Marketing scheme was qui.ckly 
organised to be in operation before the next contract 
period beginning in October 1933, after a poll. which 
demonstrated that no-less than 96~ of milk producers 
were then in favour of such a step • 
. . . . . . . 
. ... . . 
. . . 
• 
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CHAPTER E'IVE 
THE MILK MARKETING BOARD 
CONSTITUTION AN1J LATER AMENDMENTS. 
The reorganisation commission for milk (Grigg 
Commis.sion) making their report in January, 1933, rec-
ommended the formation of a Milk Marketing Scheme at 
National level, the scheme to have as its ends 
(a) The strengthening of the position of 
producers by enabling them to negotiate 
as a solid body. 
(b) The prevention of undercutting of the 
liquid market by the establishment of 
a clear distinction between the tvto 
markets, whilst securing for all producers 
a fair share of the proceeds of all milk 
sold in the more lucrative market. 
(c) The improvement of the quality of the 
milk supply. 
(d) The stimulation of the demand for milk 
for liquid consumption. 
(e) The recognition of the service rendered 
by producers catering primarily for the 
liquid market. 
(f) The· development of manufactured milk 
products. 
(g) The co-ordination of producers, distrib-
utors and manufacturers to secure prosperity 
for th~ whole milk industry, but with ade-
quate safeguards of the interests of the 
consuming public. 
The commission believed·, however, that the organisation 
of' the production side of t.he industry alone would be 
insufficient to meets the demands of the situation. They 
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recommended that in addition to the central producers• 
·board. as envisaged under the Marketing Acts, a Dairymen's 
and Manufacturers• Board should be created, and a Joint 
Milk Council composed of representatives f~om both boards 
be set up. They believed, in fact, that a joint negotiating 
committee on the lines of the old Permanent Joint Milk 
Committee would be preferable to producer-control. Such 
an arrangement, however, would not have been possible under 
existing legislation, and in any case was not favoured by 
the producers themselves. Consequently a producer-dominated 
Milk Marketing Board was set up, utilising all the powers 
granted under the Agricultural Marketing Acts with the 
exception that it was a single commodity scheme concerning 
itself only, so far as pricing was concerned, with milk, 
and making no attempt to fix butter and cheese prices also, 
though this was permitted under Section 5 of the 1931 Act. 
The Board was empowered to decide the wholesale prices 
at which milk was to be sold, after consultation with t~e 
representatives of the distributors. If, during the first 
two years of the scheme, agreement was found to be impossible, 
then the prices for those two contract periods were to be 
fixed by a tribunal appointed by the minister. After this 
two-year period tp~ Board itself was empowered to fix prices, 
though these might be questioned by an Investigation Committee 
as stipulated in the Act of 1931. The Board. was, moreover, 
empowered to iz:tsert re-sale clauses in its contracts with 
dealers and retailers, so that it was in effect responsible 
for retail price-fixing and for the determination of whole-
sale margins also, these latter being made dependent upon the 
dealer's volume of sales, so that the small dealer received 
a greater margin upon each gallon sold-than did the la~ge. 
M-ilk to be used for manufacturing purposes was to besold at 
prices related to its utilisation, which meant in fact that 
. it was still largely determined by the price of imported 
manufactured milk-products .• The only exceptionsto the 
Board's rigid control of milk prices were small producers 
with less than 4 cows and producers of special grades of 
milk. All milk apart from these latter was to be sold 
through the Boar~, by contracts to which the Board was a 
par~y. Producer-retailers were granted exemption from 
this, but were forced tq obtain licences from the Board. 
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The method by which payment was to be made to 
producers is equally interesting. England and Wales 
were divided into eleven regions. In each region the 
total receipts from milk sold in all markets, which were 
of course paid directly to the Board, were lumped together, 
plus contributions from producer-retailers; at a pre-
determined rate. An average price per gallon was then 
worked out and paid to all wholesale producers in the 
region, irrespective of whether their sales had been 
predominantly of 'liquid' or 'manufacturing' milk, pay-
ment being made by monthly cheque. 
The cost of transporting the milk from the fa liil to 
the dealer's premises was to be borne by the producer 
himself, even if. forwarded through a country collection 
depot, whilst producers supplying milk to a local creamery 
for manufacturi~ purposes and thus substantially avoidir~ 
transport costs, were to make a payment to the Board. 
Further, ~y means of a mechanism known as the "Inter-
Regional Compensation Fund", a payment was made from the 
areas in which milk had been sold mostly at 'liquid' 
prices to those wherein it had been used predominantly 
for manufacturing purposes - a practice made necessary by 
the danger already mentioned of low-cost Western milk 
being diverted to the Eastern market - a matter necessary 
as a compensation now that t~is practice was no longer 
permitted. Finally, a payment was made by all regions 
to the Scottish Milk Marketing Board as a security against 
the flooding of the English market by low-cost Scottish 
milk. These were the essential features of the Milk 
Marketing Board as constituted in 1933. 
Between 1933 and 1942 a number of changes and 
modifications were made in the regulations and policy 
of the Board, though few of them were of major significance. 
The majority of them appeared in the Milk Acts of 1934 
and 1936. The act of 1934 concerned itself principally 
with three considerations: the improvement of the returns 
to producers of milk for manufacture, the improvement of 
the quality of the milk supply, and the stimulation of 
increased consumption of liquid milk. In pursuance of 
the first of these aims it was enacted that a subsidy 
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payment should be made by the State to the Marketing 
Board in res·pect of milk used for manufacturing purposes 
whenever the manufac~uring price fell below a "standard" 
of 5d. in summer and 6d. in winter, to be repaid by the 
Board if the cheese price should rise above the "standard" 
price. For the furtherance of the second point, improve-
ment in the quality pf the milk supply, fupds were provided 
for the establishment of an "Attested"' herd scheme for 
producers whose entire herds had been shown to be free 
from Tuberculosis during three sucessive inspections and 
a bonus of lOd. a gallon was granted to producers with 
"attested" herds, in addition to the "accredited" bonus 
introduced by the Board. itself the previous year. 
Producers of the older "certified~ and "Grade 'A' (T.T.)" 
milk were still outside the scope of the milk scheme. 
Thirdly, in pursuance of ·an expanded liquid con-
sumption, a considerable subsidy was made payable to the 
Board to enable milk to be sold to school-children at 
specially low rates, the Board charging 6d. per gallon 
for the milk and the subsidy being the difference between 
this and the liquid wholesale price. A subsidy p~ment 
for research.and advertising purposes was also introduced. 
The Milk Act of 1936 served simply to renew this leglislation, 
which had been of a provisional natl.lie when introduced. 
The sphere of interest of the Milk Marketing Board 
.was further extended by the policy, adopted in 1934, of 
e·stablishing creameries in different parts o·f the country. 
Milk supplies at this ti'me were well in excess of demand 
and there was difficulty in providing some producers with 
a manufacturing outlet for their milk, though the Board 
was, of course, obliged to accept the milk whether a use 
could be found for it or not. It was hoped also that the 
operation of the creameries would also provide the Board 
with information .of the cost of production of manufactured 
products which would be useful in future pricing policy. 
By 1937 ten such creameries were in operation. 
Finally, in 1938, came the Milk Industries Act 
nationalising the system of bonus payments for special 
qualities of milk. The classification •certified" which 
necessitated farm-bottling was discontinued, and T.T. milk 
was brought within the scope of the scheme as the highest 
quality milk. A graduated scale of bonus payments was 
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prepared, and it was decided that these bonuses should 
be pro·vided jointly by state subsidy and by contribution 
from the Board, the scale being as follows: 
Grade Go·vern- - Board Total ment 
Pence per Gallon 
Accredi t·ed id. id. lid. 
T.T. lid. ld. 2id. 
Attested ltd. id. 2d. 
Accredited & Attes- 2td. ld. 3id. 
ted 
T.T. & Attested 2id. ld. 3-ld. 
(WORK OF THE MTLK M.AJUCETING BOARD, 19 3 3 - 52 , P. 18) 
In all othe:r matters the policy of the Milk Marketing 
Board remained unchanged until the outbreak of war. 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS OF THE MILK MARKETil~G BOARD 
PRODUCTION AND PRICES, 1933 - 1942. 
The Milk Marketing Board was not able to bring about 
any considerable increase in the returns payable to its 
members during the first three years of its existence, 
though pool prices were slightly higher than the average 
I . 
prices ruling under the Class IIB contracts·during the 
closing years of the N.F.U. milk scheme. 
The Griss Commission estimated that during 1931-2 
'"" the average II ' . contract price was 11. 20d., rising to 
ll.64d. during 1932-33. By comparison the pool prices 
payabl·e during the first 3 years were: 
1933-4 1934-5 
11.99d. 11.48d. 
(MILK MARKETING SCHEME FIVE YEARS REVIEW, p.23) 
Liquid prices considered alone did indeed rise quite 
considerably during this period, being: 
1933-4 1934-5 1935.6 
13.99d. 15.08d. 15.25d. 
(MILK 1\IIARKETING SCHEME FIVE Y~~ARS REVD·~W, p.l9) 
But manufacturing prices fell slightly, thus: 
·1933-4 1934.5 1935.6 
4.96d. 4.8ld. 4.95d. 
(MILK MARKETING SCHEME l!'IVE YEARS REVIEW, P• 20) 
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It has been suggested that the liquid prices shown are 
to9 low, as they do not include the payment of bonuses 
for regular production which the scheme permitted. On 
the other hand, during the second half of the year 1933-4 
and during the whole of the years 1934-5 and 1935-6 con-
siderable bonuses were being paid in respect of manufac-
turing milk under the Milk Act of 1934 - a point which 
more than cancels out the previous one. It would seem, 
then, that the Milk Marketing scheme did little to improve 
the bargaining position of milk producers dur~ng this 
period. It must be remembered, ':howa;V.eJr, that the pro-
ducer now had an assured market fe.t all the milk that he 
was able to produce, and, under the Milk Act, an assured 
minimum price plus the knowledge that the· pool price 
would not fall to minimum level (for that would imply no 
liquid milk sales throughout the whole scheme.) 
It is· probable, however, that the scheme would have 
brought about much greater benefits for its members dur-
ing this period but for three factors. Firstly, the 
price-negotiating arrangements were still in.the probation-
ary period stipulated in the original constitution, and the 
board was unable to fix milk prices at the level it con-
sidered to be desirable. During the negotiations to 
determine the liquid milk price for 1933-4 the Board was 
unable to come to terms with the representatives of the 
distributors, and the price was fixed by the Mthree 
impartial persons~ nominated by the minister. An in-
creased price was indeed awarded, but one with which 
producers declared themselves profoundly dissatisfied. 
Again in the 1934-5 negotiation, agreement proved to be 
impossible,· and again the increase awarded did not satisfy 
producers. Then, the probationary period being completed, 
the Board itself fixed monthly prices for the year 1935-6, 
but the Central Milk Distribution Committee and the Co-
operative Congress both complained to the minister, and 
after a committee of investigation the minister decided 
t,o reduce the prices favoured by the Board by ld. per 
gallon during the winter months. Moreover, the tribunals 
of 1933-4 and 1934-5 had granted to distributors considera-bly 
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increased distributive margins, both wholesale and 
retail. The Board's proposed prices _for 1935-6 
contained a considerable reduction in these margins, 
a reduction which the minister reduced from 5/l2d. per 
gallon to 2/12d. per gallon. Not until the 1936.7 
contract was the Board able to stipulate milk prices 
without interference. 
Secondly, the formation of the Milk Marketing 
Board was followed by a very considerable increase in 
the amoUnt of liquid milk being offered for sale. It 
would be unwise to allege that production increased,· for 
to enlarge a dairy herd and to increase its yield are 
both comparatively long-term undertakings. Rather, it 
is likely that the increased flow of milk onto the 
market was provided ·by a reduction in the amount being 
fed to stock, and by a decrease in·i;the production of 
farmhouse butter and cheese. Nevertheless, the increase 
was very considerable, as these figures illustrate: 
1933-4 
1934-5 
1935-6 
• • 
• • 
Total Milk Sales from Farms 
856 million gallons 
981 • " 
1,024 II 
" 
(MlLK MARKETING SCHEME FIVE YKI\.:HS REVI~W, p.l3) 
The increase in the number of registered producers 
was even more surprising: 
1934 
1935 
1936 
Registered Milk.Producers 
• • 
• • 
100,446 
127,029 
135,297 
(THE WORK OF THE MILK MARKETING BOARD, p.41) 
Naturally, such an increase in t.he supply of milk meant 
that an increased proportion of the total was forced into 
the less profitable manufacturing market, and this, not-
withstanding the' bonus upon manufacturing milk introduced 
in 1934, served to keep pool prices low. The percentage 
of the total used ~or manufacturing :purposes was: 
In 1933-4 
" 1934-5 
II 1935-6 
( l\ULK l~RKETING SCHJ!n\'IE E'IVE YEARS REVIEW, p. 15) 
Finally, d.emand for and consumption of liquid milk 
increased very little during this period. Liquid sales 
in the year 1934-5 were, only 3.5% higher than during the 
previous year, an.d the Cutforth Commission estimate that 
31' of the 3.5 was the result of the state-subsidised school 
milk scheme. In 1935-6, notwithstanding the school milk 
subsidy, liquid. consumption actually declined. And yet 
tt..is was a perio"d of increasing real ll'ages and living 
stand.a.z:ds and consumption. per head should. have been 
in.creasing. That it did not can only be ascribed to the 
increased reta.il prices necessitated by the expansion in 
distributive margins in 1933-4· and 1934-5. 
It is interesting to note that in 1935 a group of 
eastern region producers, d.isgruntled by the fact that 
. their pool price fell below that of their predominantly 
liquid s'ales, d.emanded the revocation of the Milk l\iarketing 
Scheme, but ~he subsequent poll showed a majority of 81% 
to be still in support of the scheme. 
Nevertheless, it was inevitable that the unspectacular 
record of the scheme up to this time should call forth un-
favourable comment. The Cutforth Committee, which had been 
appointed in 1935 to review the workir~ of the Milk Marketing 
Sc~eme, made· its report in· 1936, and was by no means satisfied 
with the existing arrangements. The committee believed, in 
fact, that. the scheme had only partly resolved the difficulties 
of producers, and that it had co.nsiderably impaired the wel-
fare of consumers. In the words of the report . . . . . . . 
"In some respects - more especially in the 
strengthening of the bargaining position of the p::r:oducers 
and the prevention of undercutting in the liquid market -
the immediate aims of the earlier (Grigg) commission have 
been substantially achie-ved, But not all the difficulties 
of producers have been disposed of, and in certain other 
respects also the position is still unsatisfactory. The 
cost of maintainir~ _a manufacturing industry has proved 
to be heavier than had been foreseen, and the need for 
. 
increasing liquid consumption has become more obvious and 
more urgent." 
"Some steps have been taken by the Boards towards 
improving the quality of the milk supply; a.nd the Boards, 
in conjunction with the distributors and the government, 
have devised measures and provided funds to stimulate the 
demand for liquid milk. But in spite of these efforts, 
it reiD:ains the fact that the only interests tb.at have 
suffered as a whole from the schemes have been those of 
consumers; retail prices have risen and the result has 
been to limit consumption or at least d.iscourage its 
expansion. '1 
11It is clear that, with the best will in the world, 
the·progr~ss that the producers' Boards can make unaided 
towards some of these wider objectives is limited. 
Firstly, the bu~den of subsidising the exist~ng 
production of manufacturing milk falls la.rgely upon 
liquid prices, a.nd v.re doubt whether the Board could, by 
their O¥.rn acti.on, get rid of it. 
Secondly, even if they could do so, and bring about 
every practicable economy in production, the consequent 
reduction in prices would he insufficient to induce any 
considerable increase in consumption. 
Thirdly, while the Boards may be able to secure some 
improvements in production, they may find it difficult to 
go so far as is desirable, because of the effect upon 
sections of their constituents. 
Fourthly, Producers' Boards are not the bodies to 
which the nation could, or should, look for methods of 
improving distripution. 
Finally, even in the matter of publicity the responsib-
ility should not rest solely with the producers' Boards." 
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The Report goes on to suggest a number of proposals 
for a revised Milk Scheme, which are here summarised:-
( i) 
(ii) 
The state to provide funds to make possible 
the sale of milk to selected classes of consumers 
at specially low prices, and to subsidise all 
"surplus 11• milk to liquid price-level. (Thus 
avoiding the necessity of "pooling".) 
The price payable to producers to be fixed at 
a certain level estimated to call forth the 
quantity of milk required, t.his quantity to be 
made up of 
(a) estimated requirements of ordinary 
liquid milk market. 
(b) estimated quantity to be sold at 
"assisted" prices to special classes 
of consumer. · 
(c) reserve necessary to ensure that 
all liquid requirements might be met. 
(d) Any quantity ~hat might be required 
specifically for manufacturing, 
with the addition of bonuses for level and high-
quality production. 
(iii) The wholesale price (that is, the price paid 
by the distributor) to be fixed at such a level 
that it, plus manufacturing returns and g~vern­
ment grants to subsidise manufacturing milk and 
special consumer-classes be sufficient to me·et 
the p~ments due to producers. 
(iv) Some form of machinery other than negotiation 
recommended for the determination of both producers' 
and retail prices, to: make. use of all avai la'ble 
information. A perm~nent independent body suggested, 
.. 
(v) ·Some changes in the administrative structure 
to facilitate the above policy, and also some 
modifications to electoral procedure •. 
(~i) ·A greater degree of co-ordination between the 
various interests concerned. in the production 
and sale of milk, possibly by the independent 
body mentioned under (iv) 
(vii) An independent and impartial body to function 
as a Permanent Milk_Commission, to act in co-
operation with all sections of the milk industry, 
and to seek to improve methods of production and 
distribution and to expand liquid consumption. 
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The above recommendation may be regarded as two groups, 
(i) - (III) and (iv)-(vii). The sugges·tions made in the 
first group were readily justifiable at the-time of their 
appearance, for in that year pool prices were falling and 
an ever-increasing proportio~ of milk production was being 
forced into the manufacturing market. Yet they were never 
acted upon. After 1936 pool prices rose steadily and the 
growth of the mil~ surplus.was checkeq, as we shall see 
below, so that the reform of existing marketing arrange-
-
menta no longer had an appearance of urgency. 
The ·recommendationsof the latter gro~p were still 
valid, however, and a considerable body of opinion endorsed 
the view _that control by all interest groups or independent 
~arsons was preferable to producer-control~ This view was 
repeated in a white paper (cmd 5533) outlining a policy of 
assistance to the dairying industry, which appeared during 
the following year, and culm~nated in the presentation to 
Parliament of the government~sponsored Milk Industry Bill 
of 1938. 
This Bill pro·vided for the establishment of a permanent 
Milk Commission of independent persons to keep under review 
the production, marketing and consumption of milk, and to be 
of general assistance to the industry. The Commission was 
to be assisted by a Milk Advisory Committee,representing the 
various sections of the industry. Its principal objects 
were to be arbitration between the Boards and distribution 
and the preparation of a reorganisation scheme for milk 
distri.bution. The inyestigation of distribution costs 
and the registration of dist~ibutors were also planned, to 
be administere.d by representatives of the -distributors them-
selves to~ether with two nominees of the commission. 
This Bill successfully passed the second readir~ stage 
in the House, but was then withdrawn by the Government, in 
consequence of pressure from producers and distributors 
alike, who.had little li~ing for the scheme. It seems 
likely, nevertheless, that some revised government proposal 
for a Permanent Milk Committee would have been introduced 
eventually had the second World War not intei·vened. 
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The Lucas Committee on the working of the agricultural 
marketing acts reporting in 1947 says of the projected Bill 
of 1938: 
" 
The proposals put forward in the Bill, under 
which a single independent body would in effect 
have been made responsible for planning, not 
for one branch of the milk trade only, but for 
the industry as a whole, are of interest as an 
indication of the trend of thought in responsible 
Government circles at the time. The ·intention 
behind the "Bill was that the commission which it 
sought to establish should become, as it were, 
the focal point to which the Government, the 
Boards and all concerned could look for a balanced 
and impartial judgment on the problems of the milk 
industry in all its aspects and for the performance 
of all the services of supervision and. co-ordination 
which might be required.~ 
We must, of course, remember that the Lucas Committee 
. . 
were to suggest a similar ~commodity commission" themselves. 
It does appear, however, that the concept of·a Permanent Milk 
Commission had considerable support in Government circles. 
. .. 
That the Bill of 1938 was actually withdrawn is probably 
to be attributed largely to the fact that the milk scheme 
was actually paying dividends to both producers and consumers 
by this time. 
The year 1936-7 seems to have marked the turning point 
of the fortunes of the Milk Marketing Board, and from this 
date until the outbreak of war, conditions gradually im-
proved. A revival of the attractiveness of other branches 
of agriculture served to check the expansion of liquid milk 
supplies, which thereafter increased very little, thus:-
.3.6 
.Registered Milk 
Producers 
1936-7 135·,297 910 mil. galls. 
1937-8 
-
133,640 1,063 " It 
1938-9 132,896 1,119 n It 
1939-40 136,519 1,071 n tl 
" " (THE MILK MARKETING BOARJ) AT WORK, p. 41) 
Moreover, the Board had secured progressively better prices 
for producers, largely at the expense of distributive and 
retail margins. . Figures are:-
1936-7 
1937-8 
1938-9 
1939-40 
Liquid 
Price 
15.23d. 
16.24d. 
16.25d. 
17.0ld. 
Manufac-
turing 
Price 
5.75d. 
6.88d. 
6. 60d. 
9.69d. 
("THE MILK .MARKETING BOARD AT WORK", p. 44) 
Pool 
Price 
11.99d. 
12.92d. 
12.95d. 
15.36d. 
During ~his period the retail price of milk was allowed 
to rise by no more than ltd. This policy of keepir~.the 
retail price constant during a period o! considerably 
increasing prosperity resulted in a considerable expansion 
of liquid milk sales, with·a consequent fall in the proportion 
of the total milk production used for manufacturing purposes. 
Liguid sales ~ manufactured 
1936-7 681 mil .. galls. 31 
1937-8 752 " "' 29 • 
1938-9 767 " n 31 • 
1939-40 789 n .. 26 • 
~THE MILK MA.RKE~ NG BOARD .AT WORK" , p. 4 2) 
·' .:) ' 1 I''' 1 ', I ' ' ' 
•, 
Y. 
' 
The increased liquid consumption may have been due 
in some small part to the Board's quality milk programme 
introduced "by the Milk Act of 1934 .and the Milk Industries 
Act of 1938. ·The institution of definite premiums for 
quality production r~ther than simply permission to make 
bargains outsid.e the Board 1 s contract~ proved to be a 
positive stimulus, and the number of producers making use 
of the scheme expanded considerably, as these figures show: 
Total Total 
Accredited · T.T. 
Milk Milk 
1930-7 • 331 mil. galls. 35 mil. galls. 
1937-8 377 " .. 46 n n • 
1938-9 416 n n 65 " n • 
1939-40 409 .. n 68 n " • 
("THE MILK MARKETING BOARD AT WORK", p.44) 
All in all, then, the English dairy farmer was in a much 
stronger position by 1939/40 than he had been in 1932. His 
bargaining powers had been considerably increased, he had 
secured an effective control of the retail side of the industry, 
competition between producers and price under-cutting had been 
eliminated· absolutely, and an assured market and guaranteed 
minimum price were established. And with reference to .this 
last point, a government subsidy was payable upon milk 
production for the first time. This was soon to become the 
principal factor in the milk market. 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
.. • .... 
. . . 
• 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE Il\"'DUSTRY IN WARTIME 
The outbreak of war in September-, 1939, did not 
occasion any immediate large-scale r~organisation of 
the dairyi.ng industry, the Ministry of Food preferring 
to make full use of the·machinery that the producers had 
themselves created under the marketing acts. . The only 
immediate change was a:n agreement that from January 1st, 
1940, the go·vernment should be responsible for fixing 
milk prices, both wholesale and retail, and that the 
Board should accept the Ministry's decision as to how 
milk should be utilised. From this date until October, 
1942, producer prices were guaranteed, the treasury 
undertaking to pay the difference between the guaranteed 
prices and the actual receipts from dealers. (In the 
Milk Marketing Board's own words, "The Ministry agreed 
to underwrite the Board's -~~eipts. ") It will be re-
called that previous gua-rantees had been applicable to 
the price of manufacturing milk only. 
The conditions of the war-time economy soon led to 
a fall in the production of milk, principally because 
imported feeding-stuffs had. to be banned to conserve 
shipping-space and British farmers could not immediately 
produce the requisite fodder-crops. During the con-
sequent· time-lag producti(m fell thus: 
Total Production 
·Year (mil.galls.) 
1938 
- 9 .. • • 1,119 
·1939 - 40 • • .. 1,071 
1940 - 1 •• . . 1,045 
1941 - 2 • • • • 1,079 
1942 - 3 • • • • 1,145 
1943 - 4 •• • • 1,180 
1944 - 5 •• • • 1,204 
1945 
- 6 • • • • 1,259 
("The Work of the Milk IVIarketing Board, 1933-52", p.42) 
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Recovery, it will be seen, started in 1942 as farmers 
began to adopt tr1e new techniques of grass-leys farming • 
the destruction of permanent pasture and the introduction 
of Alfalfa Lucerne and other new foods, but did not reach 
pre-war level until early 1944. At the same time the 
liquid consumption of milk was increasing at an unprecedented 
rate, thanks to the shortage of other vital foods, and main-
tained full employment. This situation, with production 
£·alling and liquid consumption increasing, could only lead 
to a drastic reduction in the amount of .milk available for 
manufacturing purposes. 
Manufacturi~~ Percentage of 
Year Milk Total (Mil. galls.) 
1939-40 • • 282 26 
1940-1 • • 119 11 
1941-2 • • 108 10 
1942-3 • • 128 11 
1943-4 • • 132 11 
1944-5 • • 133 11 
1945-6 •• 127 10 
("The r/lilk J\IIarketing Board at Work, 1933~52", p. 42) 
This, a reduction· in the proportion of total milk 
production being used for manufacturing purposes, would 
have been hailed in pre-war ;years as a very favourable 
development. Now, however, it was a matter for grave 
concern. A reduction in the amount of milk available 
for manufacturing purposes meant a reduction in the 
supplies of home-produced butter and cheese. Imports 
of dairy products were being drastically reduced, 
however, by the shortage of shipping space and the German 
occupation of Weste:rn Europe, so that it was necessary to 
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preserve home production of milk-products at as high a 
level as possible. 
IMPORTS TO U.K. 
Butter Cheese Total Milk 
Year {Mil. lb.) equivalent 
1938 1,056 323 27,6,31 
1939 970 315 25,547 
1940 591 348 17,319 
1941 488 455 16,524 
1942 301 706 15,007 
1943 339 46-3 13,169 
1944 343 507 14,034 
. 1945 425 425 14,457 
( ~pencer & Johnson, "MILK DIS~'TIIBUTION il""D 
~RICING IN GREAT BRITAIN" , p. 25.) 
In view of these facts, it will be· seen that it?Bs, essential 
that the goverr~ent should do all in its power to encourage 
the production and to regulate the consumption of milk. 
The restriction of milk sales and the rationing of 
supplies was instituted by a statutory prder of April, 1941, 
the "Sale of Milk {Restriction) Order, n which commended 
dealers to limit their fluid sales in the latter half of 
1941 to 6/7ths of what they had been i~ the first half. 
Supplies proved to be adequate in 1941, however, and this 
reduction was never imposed. Then, in October 1941, a 
. J). 
new system of ,allocation was introduced which was to 
persist until the end of rationing in 1950. Milk con-
sumers were classified into priority and non-priority 
groups. The ration allowance to priority groups remained 
fixed, whilst allowances to non-priority consumers varied 
with the availability of supplies. The allowances were: 
Expectant mothers, mothers of ) 
children under 12 months, and ) 
children between 4- 8 months,) 
or 1 - 5 years · ) 
1 pints per week. 
Children under 4 months, 
8 - 12 months, or 5 - 18 
years 
3! pints per week. 
Non-priority allowances:-
November 1941 2 pints per week 
Av. 1942 2.6 pints per week {unrestricted 
during May) 
Av. 1943 2.8 II II It • 
Av. 1944 2.9 II " It • Av. 1945 2.6 II " " • 
Gi-ITiDg an overall consumpt :ion per head of:-
1938 • 0.42 pints 
1939 0.42 lt. • 
1940 0.44 " • 1941 0.56 It • 1942 0.59 " • 1943 0.62 It • 
1944 0.64 " • 1945 0.66 n • 
(Spencer & Johnson, p.67) 
Thus, despite milk rationing, consumption per head 
was able to increase steadily throllghout the war period. 
The consumption per head of cheese, .however, increased 
very little, and that of butter fell drastically. 
~42 
Consumption per head per annum 
(lb.) 
Butter Cheese 
1934 s.: .. :A.v. • 24.8 8.8 ~· 
1940 • 14.0 8.2 
1945 • 8.5 9.7 
(Spencer & Johnson, p.61) 
The National Milk Scheme and Mi~k in Schools Scheme 
were, of course, maintained throughout the period. 
The first steps taken by the Ministry of Food to stim-
ulate mil.k production were progressive and quite consider-
able increases in the guaranteed prices to producers, a 
trend which continued throughout the war years. 
YEAR 
1938 • 
1939 • 
1940 • 
1941 • 
1942 • 
1943 • 
1944 • 
1945 • 
Producer Prices 
Summer Winter 
d. per gallon 
10.3 15.6 
10.6 15.8 
13.0 22.8 
15.7 27.5 
16.4 30.8 
16.2 30.8 
16.8 32.3 
17.4 33.0 
(Spencer & Johnson, p.80) 
Av. 
13.2 
13.3 
17.4 
20.6 
22.7 
23.2 
24.3 
25.0 
Av. retail 
price 
d.per pint 
3.46 
3.5 
3.7 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5d 
As we have seen, production began .to rise after 1941. 
The Ministry decided that a more complete control ov.er 
the industry was desirable, .however, a decision based 
largely upon the Memorandum on milk policy (cmd 6362) 
presented to Parliament in May of that year, and on 
October 1st, 1942, a·new agreement between the Mi~istry 
and the Milk Marketing Board came into effect. 
Until this time all milk had been sold from producer 
to distributor or wholesaler, with the Board entering the 
contract only as a third party. Now, .however, the Board 
itself was to purchase all producer's milk at the prices 
fixed by the Ministry, and to· re-sell the whole of the 
production to the ministry at prices which made allowance 
for the Board'·s administrative costs. The ministry was 
to sell the milk to distributors at fixed prices. The 
Board were to remain responsible for the collection of all 
money due from purchasers of milk and for the payment of 
the guaranteed monthly prices to producers, and in addition 
were to assume responsibility, on behalf of the producers, 
for the transport of all milk to the first point of delivery. 
These changes, however, with the exception of-the reorgan-
isation of transport, .had little practical significance · 
for the producer. The Board's official history indeed 
states:-
"So far as they affected the Board's general 
organisation the new arrangemen~s amounted 
to a·change more in form than in fact. The 
Board signed a new agreement with each pro-
ducer to cover the sales of his wholesale 
milk, discontinuing the old tripartite arrange-
ment. In effect all produce~s for the time 
being continued to send their milk to the 
same market until they were notified by the 
Board to do otherwise •••..•.. 
There was- no longer any necessity for separate 
contracts between the buier and the Ministry 
and purchaser's monthly accounts were prepared 
in exactly the same way as hitherto except 
that they have the Ministry's heading ins~ad 
of that of the Board. " 
The delegation of responsibility for the transporting 
of milk to points of first delivery to the Board was, how-
ever, singificant, for it was done to facilitate the 
rationalisation of transport in the milk industry. During 
the pre-war years cross-hauling and duplication had developed 
to a marked extent, due on the one hand to the necessity for 
some dealers to draw supplies from quite distant areas if 
they·;.,wanted milk of special. qua.li ty, and on the other to the 
willingness of some producers to deliver their milk to quite 
distant· deale:r:s rather than inc:ur the rather heavy transport 
charges on depot milk. By 1941, however; vehicles, petrol 
and manpower were in short supply, and rationalisation 
became essential. Rationalisation schemes were adopted in 
the Bristol area and in the transport serving three creameries 
in South Wales, and proved successful, and following the 
Memorandum of 1942 (Cmd 6362) the Board was authorised to 
institute the nation-wide rationalisation of farm transport. 
The enforcement of the scheme evolved was rendered compara-
tively easy by the state control of petrol supplies, for 
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it was poss.ible to curtail the petrol ration of .any 
haulage agent ·who refused to co-operate i~ the scheme. 
The reorganisation proceeded quite slowly, however, and 
was not completed before 1945. One important factor 
preventing the complete rationalisation of milk delivery 
was the promise made at the introduction of the scheme 
to maintain as far as possible the volumes received by 
the various handlers - a commitment which prevented the 
closing of many country depots which might otherwise 
have been dispensed with. Unfortunately no figures 
are available to demonstrate the economies effected by 
rationalisation during this period. In 1948, however, 
the Ministry of Food estimated that rationalisation was 
by that tim~ effecting a saving of 45,000 vehicle-miles 
per day, a saving of. 25%• At a census held in 1952, 
82% of milk producers considered that rationalisation 
had proved beneficial and desired its continuance. 
Meanwhile, a similar development was taking place 
at retail level., the zoning of ·the town and city 
distribution of milk. There again there was much 
. . . 
overlapping, with possibly four or five roundsmen serving 
the same street or block, and again the shortage of 
vehicles, petrol, rubber and manpower made rationalisation 
necessary. In some cities voluntary route-shortening 
agreements developed during 1940-1, but not until October 
1942 did a national system of zoning appear. This scheme 
was organised and controlled by the ·Ministry of Food, not 
the Milk Marketing·Board. Under the scheme each distrib-
utor was allocated certain streets in which he and he alone 
might retail milk, and was forbidden to trespass into 
a.q.other distributor' a terri tory on pain of havi.ng the 
ministry cancel or transfer the consumer-registrations 
on hie books. The scheme was not universal. It was 
applicable. only to urban areas of 10,000 peopl~ or more. 
Co-operative societies were exempted, and in some cases 
"no-man's land" streets and areas in which distributors 
might still compete were defined. Moreover, the consent 
of the lc;>cal tr.ade-cou.ncil was always obtained before a 
zoning plan was introduced, and in a few areas in which 
no agreement was reached competitive delivery was permitted 
to continue. Nevertheless, zoning plans were put into 
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effect in 400 of the 669 qualifying areas by April, 
1943, and in more than 600 of them by May, ·1944. In 
1943 the Ministry made an estimate of the saving of man-
power and transport realised in areas which had ad~ppted. 
zoning at that time, the statistics being:-
Before After· ~ Re-Zoning duct ion 
LONDON 
Men •• • • . . 5,609 4,637 17 
Women .. • • • • 2,644 1,998 24 
All vehicles • • . . 5,904 4,445 25 
Petrol vehicles 367 225 39 
Petrol (Gals. per w~ek) 4,100. 2,400 41 
PROVINCES 
Men .. . . 14,033 11.597 17 
Women • • .. 8,411 7,537 10 
All vehicles • • 27,200 .23,500 10 
Petrol vehicles .. 10,119 8,480 16 
P.etrol (Gals. per week) 81,300 55,800 31 
Total mileage per week 1,727,100 1,153,600 33 
Another important innovation was made in 1943. 
Until this time the Ministry, though guaranteeing prices 
to producers for all milk produced, had not consistently 
worked at a loss, for the retail price of milk had been 
high enough to cover the prices paid to prod·ucers plus 
the administrative expenses allowable to the Board, and 
distributor's margins. But -in 1941 the retail price of 
milk had been frozen at 4.5d. per pint, and when the need 
to increase milk production necessitated further increases 
in producer-prices in 1941 and 1942, it became obvious 
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that if a further increase i:n retail prices was to be 
avoided a subsidy would have to be made payable upon 
all milk produced, and from 1943 onwards the price paid 
to producer~ by the Board for their milk ha~. been higher 
than the price at which the Ministry re-sold the milk to 
distributors. 
Milk subsidy statistics are:-
Direct Welfare Total, including feeding Subsidies on Subsidies 
Prod·ll.ction stuff subsidies, etc. Year 
1939 1.0 0.7 1.7 
1940 5.3 0.7 6.3 
1941 4.4 8.2 13.8 
1942 2.0 15.9 20.5 
1943 10.8 17.2 30.6 
1944 11.5 19.9 38.0 
1945 17.4 19.3 44.3 
(Spencer & Johnson, p.90) 
(These figures relate to the whole of the United 
Kingdom and not to England and Wales only.) 
All other changes int.roduced by the Board or the 
Ministry of Food duri.ng the war years were concerned with 
the vital question of increasing production, both in terms 
of quantity and quality. They included the establishment 
of an artificial insemination service, of a Voluntary Milk 
Records Bureau, a testing scheme to ensure that all milk 
was of good keeping quality, a progeny tast bureau and a 
number r1 grass-drying centres. Also a number of ,new 
creameries were constructed, though these had, by this time, 
come to be used as transport ~ssembly points rather than 
for the manufacture of milk products. The sum total of 
these facilities was that the production of milk per cow, 
'which had fallen at the beginning of the war with the loss 
of imported feeding-stuffs, steadily recovered, and the 
sale of the highest quality milk doubled between 1939 
and 1945. 
-
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Accredited T.T. % of. all AV. Year Milk Milk Cattle Yield per 
Mil. Gals. ATTESTED cow 
1939 • • 409 68 3.1~ 5,738 lb. 
1940 . . 385 64 5.7% 5,573 
1941 •• 379 64 5.~ 4,902 
1942 • • 383 70 5.8~ 4,819 
1943 • • 375 95 5.7% 5,005 
1944 •• 367 125 5.6~ 5,077 
1945 •• 365 156 -6. OJb 5,139 
-----
(Milk Marketing Board, "The Board at Work, 1933-52") 
The second world war, we may say, in its impact upon the 
fluid mil.k industry of England and Wales, pro~u.ced three effects 
which were to be of lasting significance. Firstly, it brought 
about ~ increase in the per capita liquid consumption of 
milk which.replaced the customary pra-war liquid surplus of 
milk by an excess of demand over supply in the liquid market. 
T.h.is increased consumption was to persist durl ng the sub-
3equent period.· Secondly, it stimulated technical and 
organisational reforms which it might have taken two decades 
to bring about under peacetime conditions. Thirdly, it 
. pro·vided, fo:r the first time, the spectacle of the fluid 
milk industry under full centralised control, and in so doing 
provined .material for the discussions upon the future of the 
indus~ry which were shortly to ensure. We pass, then, to 
our final _section, in which we shall consider the proposals 
and d.evelopments to which the post-war period has given 
birth. 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POST - WAR DEVELOPMENTS 
When the second world war ended in July, 1945, it 
must have been immediately obvious to ·all concerned in 
milk production and distribution that the termin~tion of 
hostilities could not bring with it the end af rationing 
and the removal of all controls. Fluid milk supplies 
were still hardly sufficient to meet demands, and it was 
expected that the solid policy upo:n which the government 
intended to embark would mean a steadily expanding·· liquid 
consumption throughout the ensuing decade. Moreover, the 
importing of manufactured milk ~roducts· ~;m overseas, 
which had been so long limited by lack of shipping space, 
was now to be kept at a low-level for another reason-
the ·need to effect a balance of payments, which would 
mean a substanti~l reduction of imports to counterbalance 
the loss of foreign·investments. It seemed safe 'to 
assume that the control of all agricultural production 
and marketing m~st be left in the hands of the Ministry 
for some years at least. Even at this early stage, 
however, some consideration was being given to the future 
position of the Agricultural Market:ing Boards. On 
November 7th, · 1945, the then Minister of Food made a 
statement outlining the Goverrunent's future policy. 
The main points of the statement were that 
(i) The Government accepted_responsib-
ility for the provision of the necessary 
supplies of the main foods at .reasonable 
prices to maintain an adequate standard 
o'f nutrition. 
(ii) The Ministry of· Food would be placed 
on a permanent footing as the department 
of state primarily responsible for the 
procurement and subsequent distribution 
of all foods of importance in the national 
diet; 
(iii) So long as th~ period of food short-
age lasted·there would be a continuance 
of contro],.s, usually invol·ving consumer 
rationing or its equivalent cou.pled with 
price control at all stages of distribut:ion. 
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When supplies were again readily available, however, the 
Government intended to operate only such controls as were 
considered necessary to ensure the protection of the 
· cons"W!lers' interests and standard of· nutrition and the reform 
of distributive systems. 
The distribution of milk had, of course, been exten-
' sively reformed already under the rationalisation plan 
introduced in 1942. But the phrase ~protection of the 
cons"W!lers• interests"' is important in that it indicates a 
dissatisfaction with the producers-Board system of marketing 
in Go·vernment circles, and it seems reasonable to assume 
that the concept of a Joint Committee was still held in 
favour. 
In December 1946 a committee was set up, under the 
chairmB.llship of The Lord Lucas, to "review the making of 
the Agricultural Marketing Acts;· to consider what modifi-
cations of the provisions of those Acts for the organisation 
of producers are desirable in the light of experience before 
1939 and on the developments in Government policy since then; 
and to make recommendations, "' thus emphasising that some 
modification of the· Marketing Board system was eventually 
planned. 
In 1947 Government agricultural policy was given 
statutory form by the Agriculture Act of that year, an Act 
"For the purpose of promoting and maintaining, 
by the provision of guaranteed prices and 
assured markets for the produce mentioned 
in the first schedule, a stable and efficient 
Agricultural industry capable of producing such 
part of the nation's food and other agricultural 
produce as it is in the nation's interest to 
produce in the kingdom, and of producing it at 
ininim"Wil prices consistently with proper remuner-
ation and living conditions for farmers and 
workers in agriculture and an adequate return 
' 
upon capital invested in the industry." 
As such, it provided a comprehensive statement of 
Government policy. Its enactments were, briefly, that 
the Minister was to review economic conditions in agriculture 
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at fixed intervals, and to fix guaranteed price level 
in the light of these reviews and· as soon after them as 
possible, and that he should ma..k:e no arrangements for 
any scheduled product (milk, cattle, sheep, pigs and 
eggs) that might entail earnings below the guaranteed 
minimum. Other enactments concerned agricultural 
holdings, etc. and did not directly affect milk production. 
The importance of this Act for the milk-producing 
industry was simply that the wartime conditions of 
government control and guaranteed prices were given 
statutory authority'and their continuance pledged, for 
the immediate future at least. This was probably an 
- important contributory factor in the steady increase of 
milk production in post-war years. 
The Lucas Committee made their report in the closing 
months of 1947, ann, after outlining the past history of 
the Marketing Boards, stated that in their opinion the 
futUre of Agricult~ral Marketing must lie in one of four 
alternatives, these being:-
( i) The laissez-faire position existing 
:pefore 1931. 
(ii) The pre-war Marketing Board system, 
of which the report says 
"produce·rs were in a position, 
subject to certain safeguards, to exert 
monopoly control over the ·marketing and 
distribution of agricultural produce." 
(iii) The existing system of control by the 
Ministry of Food. 
(iv) 11A system under which the ~a.rketing of 
farm produce could be managed on public 
utility lines by corporations repres-
enting not any sectional interest,.but 
the community in general." 
And, adds the rep.ort , 
"It is this last solution which we emphatically recommend 
should be adopted," 
The existing system of Ministry control is condemned 
on the.grounds that civil service organisat~on is really 
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not suitable for marketing duties. The pre-war-Marketing 
systems are disposed of in the following words:-
"There appear to us to be two arguments which 
are conclusive against permitting producer control 
of Agricultural Marketing. Firstly, marketing is 
a continuous process in which not only the pr.oducer 
but the consumer and distributive trades are 
interested. To give one party (producers) 
exclusive monopoly control of the process was only 
tolerable so long as the producers were suffering 
from the economic disadvantage of a supply that 
exceeded effective demand. Secondly, in~-;:s.cj·,.~f~~r 
as products listed in Schedule I of the Agriculture 
Act are concerned, it is the taxpayer who in effect 
buys the produce at the point at which the guarantee 
operates." 
Perhaps most important of all, the Report goes on:-
"It is for this reason, also, that we dismiss 
the alternative advanced by distributive organ-
isations which indicated that the only amendment 
required in the Agricultural Marketing Acts as 
they stand is the dilution, if not abolition, of 
producer-control of boards by bringing on m these 
bodies representatives of all the other trade 
interests concerned. 11 
The Lucas Committee, then, believed that it would be 
necessary to go much further than the appointment of permanent 
councils of interest-group representatives or indepenm·snt 
persons. with which previous reformers had been preoccupied, 
and indeed. stated that 
"We strongly oppose any form of m~mination 
.of members of Commodity Commissions (by which 
name ·they decided to call the Boards they wishE3d 
to see set up) by outside bodies. Man bers of 
commissions will be, in fact, the business exec11tives 
of the taxpayer." 
The Commodity Commissions were to be given control of 
their respective products throughout all stages of its 
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production, distribution and processing and were, in 
addition, to make all possible economies in distribution: 
and to act in an ·advisory capacity to the Ministry. The 
existi.ng producers' Marketing Boards would be preserved 
·to represent their members in price-negotiations and to 
enforce the decisions of the commodity commission, but, 
said the Report: 
"We would emphasise that no tenderness for 
existing interests must be allowed to·stand in 
the way of the tax-payer's right to have his 
produce disposed of by the most efficient organ-
isation possible."! 
l~o specific proposals for the marketing of fluid milk were 
made. 
Needless to say, the proposals of the Lucas Committee 
have not been implemented, for a number of reasons. We 
need mention only the successful record of co-opera.tion· 
. between Boards and Ministry during the war, the preference 
on the part of Government and permanent -d.epartment~l staff 
alike for the utilisation of existing machinery, a41 the 
desire of the party then in power to woo the agricultural 
constituencies'· even assuming that there was thought to be 
any advantage in the s.cheme. It seems safe to state that ~ 
responsib+e thought in Government circl·as t~nded towards t~e 
modification of the existing structures rather than towards 
their replacement by a new form of authority, and towards a 
more ·moderate policy generally. 
In 1948 came further p:z~oposals for the reform of the 
M~rketing Board system (though again the term ".reform"· is, 
perhaps, something of an understatement.) .The Williams 
Committee had been appointed in 1946 to examine the distrib-
ution of liquid milk and. to advise upon any changes which 
might be necessary. Their· review of the distributive system. 
is, .indeed, an able a.nd invaluable study. Their projected 
change~, however, w:ith which we axe here concerned, amounted 
to the repeal of the whole of the Acts of 1931 and 1933. 
The authority which they proposed to se~ up bears a certain 
similarity to the "semi-public corporation" of the Lucas 
Report, being described as:-
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"A statutory milk authority, not part · 
of the civil service, but workirlg under the 
overall authority of the Government depart-
ments concerned." 
The appropriate Ministry was to continue to fix prices, 
subsidies and retail margins, the "Milk Commission", a 
small body of independent members, being responsible solely 
for ·the negotiation of seasonal variations with the producers, 
payments to producers, and the. control of transport to first 
to first destination and the management of creameries. It 
P.1ight also- undertake the negotiation of distributive and 
manufacturing margins_. Essentially the Williams "Milk 
Commission" is a combination of alternatives (iii) and 
(iv) of the Lucas report. 
The most interestir~ sections of the Williams report 
are those which comment upon the status of the existing Milk 
Marketing Board. For example -
I 
"The Milk Marketing Boards would like at 
least to have back their full pre-war povvers. 
But if this were done the field of dispute 
between them and any potential Distributors' 
Board would be widened and efficiency lost. 
It would. be necessary tc) p·rovide for appeal 
to an independent body." 
And agai.n 
"The 111ilk Marketing Boards have lost what, 
in the views of the previous committee of en-
quiry, was the main reason for constituting 
them, a.nd what in practice has been their m~in 
function, the.negotiation and fixing of producers' 
prices. These are now fixed by the government, 
and the producers· have less interest in the 
' 
result than consumers or taxpayers." 
(This last comment, at least, seems manifestly unfair. In 
so far as producers' prices were not the determinant of the 
government-&ubsidised retail prices,_ consumers were not 
directly affected by producer prices; we must remember that 
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consumers were paying only 80}~ of the total cost of 
milk at this period. An!l .. producers were materially 
affected by producers' prices at least as much as tax-
payers!). 
This committee did not even share the op~n~on expressed 
in the Lucas report that the Marketing Board.s ·should be 
preserved for negotiative e.nd disciplinary ·purposes, 
believi.ng that these functions might be equally well 
undertaken by the National Farmers' Union, and stated 
that the Board's executive staff would be absorbed by 
the Milk Commission. 
In the following year came further legislation 
which considerably modified the position and powers of 
the Marketing ~oards, though not in accordance with the 
recommendations of either of the post-war committees, 
The essential provisions of the Agricultural Marketing . 
Act_ of 1949, described. as. "An act to repeal the Agri-
cultural :Marketing Acts,·· "l:931 to 1933, and for purposes 
connected therewith " may be quickly summarised. Some 
modifications of the composition of the boards was 
announced, but the significant clauses are those which · 
extend the powers of the Minister to overrule a Board 
"If it appears to the Minister·that the result 
of a:ny act or omission of the· Board is or will 
be •.•••••••..• contrary to the public interest, 
the Minister maw give to the Board such directions 
as he considers necessary or expedient for the 
purposes of preventing that result or mitigating 
the damage to the public interest entailed thereby, 
and it shall be the duty of the Board to comply 
with that or der, providing that it is not required 
to do anything which it has no power to do under 
the scheme • " 
The Act further provides that a Minister may take 
immediate action upon a complaint made to him by a con-
sumers' committee or other body concerning the doings of a 
Marketing Board, if he considers that such action is necessary · 
in the public interest, a.nd that 
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"The 1~1inister shall by: order make any 
amendments to any scheme that appear to him 
to be necessary to bring the scheme into 
accordance with any provisios of the Act 
which require schemes to be framed to secure 
certain results." 
The Act did, however, widen the scope of the Boards by 
permitting them to render a great variety of services to 
their constituents, stating that they might -
"manufacture or acquire and sell or let 
to r~gistered producers anything required for 
the production or transportation, handling-
processing of the product, or render any 
necess~y service or co-operate wlth any person 
in doing so.rt 
The Act.of 1949 was ~mportant, however, not so much for the 
controls which it imposed upon the Marketing Boards, impor-
tant as these we·re, as for the fact that by framing such 
controls it acknowledged that the Boards were to remain in 
existence, and in all probability to res~~e at least some 
part of their functions of :pre-control days • 
. After 1947 a general tendency for the pre-war position 
to reinstate itself is noticeable in the milk industry. 
Fluid milk production was still increasing steadily and. 
soon became adequate for all demands: indeed, the proportion 
being used. for manufacturing purposes began to rise after 
1947. 
Year 
19_44 - 5 
1945 
- 6 
1946 
- 7 
1947 
- 8 
1948 9 
1949 - 50 
1950 - 51 
1951 2 
Total Manufacturing 
Pro- use 
duct ion 
Mil. Galls. 
1,204 133 
1,259 127 
1,243 98 
1,321 137 
1,459 147 
1,521 239 
1,579 207 
1,517 136 
Percent-
age 
Manu-
factured 
11% 
10 
8 
10 
10 
15 
13 
9 
Year 
1952-3 
1953-4 
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TOTAL Prodn. M:a.nufacturing 
Mil.Galls. 
1600 
1650 
300 
310 
(Milk Marketing Board) 
Percentage 
Manufactured 
18% 
18% 
In May and Jtme of 1950 unlimited liquid sales of 
milk were permitted for the first time. This was repeated. 
in the smmner of 1949, and finally milk rationing ended ~n 
January 1950. 
In 1948 the Wiliiains Commi t.tee, commenting upon the 
zoning of milk distz-ibution in towns and cities, stated that 
"We can.see no reason for excluding new 
entrants to the retail milk trade once Sllpplies 
I 
ate plentiful •i 
and also that 
"It would be unreasonable to deny to the consumer 
indef~ni tely the ·choice of supplies", 
and suggested that consumers be permitted to change their 
registrations with suppliers at certain times. This 
proposal was put into. effect in MB¥ 1948, and the breakdown 
of the zoning system of delivery dates from this date. 
Consumer registrations ~ere finally terminated, except for 
consumers obtaining free a specially subsidised milk, in 
May 1950, shortly after the abolition of milk rationing. 
It is interesting to note that the Williams Committee, 
though believing that it would be possible to ol~tain even 
greater economies through zoning, believed that 
"This woul:d only be possible under public 
control. To give one private distributor, on 
an a~algamation or union of such distributors, 
legal monopoly in any area seems to us out. of 
the question;:!'· 
I 
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and they for this reason advocated a return to con-
ditions of free competition amongst retailers. Two 
members of the committee, however, issued a minority 
report in which they declared themselves to be of the 
opinion that public .ownership and operation of the 
milk distribution system preferable to competitive 
distribution as a permanent arrangement. 
Another important development has been the partial 
withdrawal o! government subsidies upon milk production 
after 1949, observable in the reduction in guaranteed 
minimum prices:-
Pricing Year 
1950-1 
1951-2 
1952-3 
1953-4 
• 
• 
• 
Guaranteed Minimum 
2/2d. 
2/2d. 
2/-
1/lOd. 
and in the reduction of subsidies upon foodstuffs and 
fertilisers, so that, although both production and the 
wholesale price of milk have continued to increase, the 
amount being utilised for pay:ment of subsid.ies has· fallen. 
There bas been no reduction, it should be noted, of 
subsidies payable under the welfare scheme. 
GOVERM~NT SUBSIDIES UPON MILK PRODUCTION 1 1946L5~ Welfare Direct Food.s and 
Year Subsidies Milk :r,ert ilizer s 
I~U l. Es. 
1946 24.5 19.5 8.7 
1947 38.5 23.4 10.9 
1948 '35.8 28.4 17.5 
1949 44.2 31.2 32.6 
1950 63.6 30.2 22.3 
1951 75.7 30.1 8.6 
1952 60.0 35.2 9.3 
1953 46.0 40.8 9.2 
(Spencer & Johnson, p.90) 
(These figures relate to U.K. as a whole and not to 
. England and Wales only.) 
TOTAL 
52.7 
72.8 
81.1 
108.0 
117.1 
114.4 
104.5 
96.0 
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Finally, in April, 1954, we have seen a state-
ment of Government policy which places the Milk Marketing 
Board in a position comparable with that which it occupied 
in 1949. Comparable, but, be it noted, by no means 
identical, for there are Luportant-ciifferences. The 
Marketing Act of 1949 had already done much to strengthen 
ministerial control over the Marketing Boards, as we 'have 
seenJ and the 1954 agreements set further checks and limits 
to their powers. 
It had been announced in a white paper of November, 
1953, that the Government intended to bring t.he control 
of marketing, d.istri·bution and selling prices to an end 
as quickly as possible, and discussions were arranged 
between the Government, Milk Marketing ~oards and National 
Farmers' Union to decide what form f~ture arrangements 
for milk marketing were to take. The arrangements 
fi:nally agreed- upon entailed the removal of tha J\'linistry 
of ~ood from the market, and the re~institution of the 
Milk Marketing Board as the representative of producers 
in the sale of fluid milk. It was agreed that the 
Government sho~ld continue to fix market prices for as 
long as conswner-subsidy should continue, after which 
the Board was to be a.t liberty to negotiate milk prices 
with the buyers' representatives. 
A number of modifications unknown before the war 
have, however, been introduced. It is now necessary, 
for instance, for the Board to give to the Minister 
prior notification of any projected price-negotiation. 
Mo:r:·e important has been the setting up of a Joint Milk 
Committee, to be composed of members of the Milk 
Marketing Board and of the Central Milk Distributive 
Committee. This committee will discus~ any projected 
changes in milk marketing pr-ocedure, and if unable to 
agree, will refer all questions to an independent 
consultant, whose ruling both sides will be obliged to 
accept. This concept of a Joint Committee is remarkably 
similar to that of the Milk Advisory Committee incor-
porated in the projected Milk Industry Bill of· 1938. 
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Guaranteed prices, it was decided, were to be 
continued, but should be coupled with a "standard 
quantity" arrangement, the full guaranteed price to 
be paid for supplies up to this quantity and a lower 
price for any excess, the Board pooling receipts from 
sales at both prices as during pre-war years. The 
actual receipts of the Board will depend also upon the 
difference between the lower guaranteed "price and the 
actual price received for manufacturing milk, this 
difference to be met - or shared, as the case may be -
between the Board and Government on equal terms. 
Thus the Board, though in a much modified position, 
is now once more a Milk Marketing Board in fact as well 
as in name. The Board's General Manager, Mr. J.L. Davies, 
said up·on ·the 21st anniversary of the founding c£ the Milk 
Marketing Board, in Octoher, 1954, that:-
nwe came out of control, at least full con-
trol, in April, and we celebrate our coming of 
age aft·er six months experience once again of 
selling milk in the market. The Board has sur"V"ived 
as a producer's marketing organisation after a period 
of co.n.trol and much debat·e - that is in itself an 
achievement...... On the other hand, we cannot 
be f~ee and unfettered like private industry. 
Decisions by a marketing board affect an industry, 
and may affect all parties to that industry in-
cluding consumers and the government. The · 
Marketing Board is almost a public Authority, 
but not quite .•.•.•.. it would be the wish of any 
·qeneral Manager that we ·shall have all the courage 
and. enterprise of private industry, together wi. th 
·the caution and capacity of the civil service. " • 
And upon that pious note, I close. 
• The Milk Producer, November 1954. 
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